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Abstract

The issue of law enforcement is central to land property rights. Modes of property rights
enforcement can be performed either with or without intervention of the state. This article focuses
on the latter mode of enforcement; that is, how people manage to enforce their land rights without
the involvement of state institutions and to what extent informal arrangements can offer effective
enforcement and secure land property rights. This article also contributes to the debate on how
formal and informal institutions can be used to secure property rights and resolve disputes over
land ownership. In particular, this paper examines how the people of Flores, East Nusa Tenggara
Province, settle land disputes among themselves. Many available studies indicate that the residents
of Flores rely heavily on informal land dispute resolution based on adat (customary) law rather
than formal or legal rules. Adat provides certain sense of security and has been proven effective in
resolving conflicts in a relatively closed and homogenous community. Moreover, it offers greater
accessibility, flexibility and legitimacy that support reconciliation process between the disputing
parties.
Keywords: informal dispute resolution, adat law, flores, informal institutions.
Abstrak
Isu penegakan hukum merupakan masalah inti dalam perlindungan hak-hak kebendaan atas
tanah. Perlindungan atas hak kebendaan tersebut dapat diberikan baik oleh Negara maupun
oleh aktor-aktor lain selain Negara. Artikel ini fokus pada perlindungan yang diberikan oleh
aktor bukan Negara, yaitu bagaimana masyarakat mampu untuk melindungi hak-hak kebendaan
mereka tanpa keterlibatan institusi Negara. Pertanyaannya adalah,sejauh mana institusi informal
dapat bekerja secara efektif untuk memberikan perlindungan atas hak kebendaan atas tanah?
Artikel ini juga berkontribusi terhadap debat mengenai bagaimana institusi formal dan informal
dipergunakan oleh masyarakat untuk melindungi hak milik mereka dan untuk menyelesaikan
konflik terkait dengan tanah dalam masyarakat. Secara khusus, artikel ini membahas mengenai
bagaimana masyarakat di Flores, Nusa Tenggara Timur mempergunakan hukum adat untuk
menyelesaikan konflik yang terjadi dalam masyarakat. Berbagai penelitian menunjukkan bahwa
masyarakat Flores masih sangat bergantung kepada mekanisme hukum Adat ketimbang hukum
nasional. Hukum Adat terbukti memberikan perlindungan kuat terhadap hak kebendaan dan
dapat mengatasi konflik secara efektif, terutama dalam sebuah komunitaskecil yang homogen.
Selain itu, hukum Adat memberikan akses yang lebih besar, lebih fleksible, dan memiliki legitimasi
yang kuat dalam proses rekonsilitasi diantara para pihak yang bersengketa.
Kata Kunci: penyelesaian sengketa informal, hukum adat, flores, institusi informal.
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Informal dispute resolution, “informal justice,”1 or “traditional justice system”2 is
the most common type of dispute settlement in Indonesia and is typically applied
by members of the lower class who live in rural areas or poor urban communities.3
This paper defines informal dispute resolution as any kind of dispute settlements
that are reached outside formal adjudication system. This definition includes dispute
resolution based on adat law. Adat literally means custom or tradition. In this paper,
the term adat is used to refer to informal institutions connoting “particular timehonored practices and institutions, inherited by communities rather than imposed by
the state.”4 Control over territory and other natural resources is at the core of conflicts
and struggles in Indonesia5 and is one of the central issues in adat law.

Asia Foundation shows that informal mechanisms are the preferred method
for solving disputes over the past ten years. This study found that only 18% of the
respondents pursued settlements and defended their interests through formal
institutions, while 57% used informal means, and 32% chose to bury their grievances
and do nothing.6 The World Bank estimates an even higher use of non-state justice
system and claims that as many as 90% of disputes in Indonesia have been processed
using informal adjudication system.7
To some extent, citizens’ preference for informal solutions over the formal ones
can be attributed to their perceptions of the state judiciary as “highly corrupt,”
“complicated,” “expensive,” and offering limited flexibility. The ineffectiveness
of formal institutions reduces incentives for people to use these institutions for
adjudicating their disputes.8 Informal mechanisms, on the other hand, are perceived
to be “quicker, cheaper, and easier,” and thus more attractive than the formal system.9
1
The World Bank defines informal justice as “local dispute resolution – arbitration and mediation
practiced by village heads, traditional customary leaders, neighborhood leaders and religious leaders –
sometimes based on tradition, but equally often on the subjective assessment of community leaders without explicit reference to either state or customary law.” World Bank, Justice for the Poor: Forging the Middle
Ground: Engaging Non-State Justice in Indonesia [Menemukan Titik Keseimbangan: Mempertimbangkan Keadilan Non-Negara di Indonesia], (Jakarta: World Bank, 2009), p.ix.
2
Sinclair Dinnen, “‘Traditional’ Justice Systems in the Pacific, Indonesia and Timor-Leste,” (presented
at The 2009 Justice for Children in the Pacific, Indonesia and Timor-Leste, EAPRO Sub-Regional Workshop,
April 2009), www.unicef.org/tdad/uniceftradpacificindonesiatimor09.doc, accessed 1 March 2014.
3
World Bank, loc.cit.
4
Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley(1), “Introduction: Radical Conservatism – The Protean Politics
of Adat” in The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to
Indigenism, edited by Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 3.
5
John R. Bowen, Islam, Law, and Equality in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
p. 63. See also Davidson and Henley (1), op.cit., p. 3.
6
Asia Foundation, Citizens’ Perceptions of the Indonesian Justice Sector (Jakarta: Asia Foundation,
2001).
7
Non-state justice is defined as “all forms of dispute resolution besides formal court adjudication.”
World Bank, op.cit., p. 4. See also Stephen Golub, “Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: the Legal Empowerment
Alternative,” Working Paper No. 14, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
8
The survey by Asia Foundation shows that general court and police are perceived as ineffective because they are “unreliable, disrespectful, arrogant, corrupt, apt to demand bribes, ignores human rights
and serves the wealthy.” In contrast, informal institutions such as community leaders, religious leaders, and
religious court are considered as effective, with positive assessments such as “trustworthy, does job well,
timely, helpful, the first to go to with a legal problem.” Asia Foundation, op.cit., p. 5.
9
The World Bank Social Development Unit of Indonesia, “Village Justice in Indonesia: Case Studies on
Access to Justice, Village Democracy, and Governance,” (a report from Justice for the Poor Team, The World
Bank Social Development Unit of Indonesia, February 2004), p. 7, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IN-
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As Davidson and Henley observe, “where the rule of the state law is weak or absent,
people depend heavily on each other’s co-operation for substance and security.”10

This article illustrates property rights enforcement through informal institutions
by examining dispute resolution mechanism in Flores, East Nusa Tenggara Province.11
The analysis proceeds in four sections. The first section discusses adat in general
and its relation to legal pluralism in a post-colonial country. It then examines adat
institutions in Flores, the role of adat chiefs in enforcing property rights, and how
local people manage to enforce their land rights without the involvement of state
apparatus. Furthermore, it analyzes the nature of adat as informal institutions, to
what extent adat falls in the category of informal institutions, and how informal land
rights institutions affect the formal ones. Finally, it also contributes to the theoretical
debate on property rights institutions.

II. Adat, Legal Pluralism, and the Colonial Legacies

Legal pluralism is a phenomenon that often occurs in post-colonial countries, in
which an indigenous self-regulating system has persisted under the cumulative weight
of colonialism, modernization, and globalization.12 Dinnen defines legal pluralism
as “a situation where multiple forms of law co-exist within a single environment or
setting.”13 Favali and Pateman, on the other hand, employ a stronger definition of
legal pluralism as coexistence that involves not only various rules but also multiple
actors who produce law.14 That way, they incorporate institutional elements whose
legitimacy originates outside the state power.

Indonesia is a country with high level of internal diversity. It is home to 300 ethnic
groups with more than 700 languages and dialects spoken, making Indonesia one of
the most heterogeneous countries in the world.15 Long before the arrival of colonial
powers in Indonesia several centuries ago, many local communities had operated
within their self-regulating systems with multiple political entities.16

The Dutch colonization brought about massive changes to the Indonesian political
and legal system. In the mid-19th century, the Dutch established colonial administration
based on the politics of divide and rule (devide et impera) for furthering their gains.
They separated the population into three racial groups, placing Europeans as the
first class race, Foreign Orientals (including Chinese, Arabians, and Indians) as the
second, and Native Indonesians (inlanders) as the third class. Each group was subject

TINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/04Publication/VilllageJustice+.pdf, accessed on 1 March 2014.
10
Davidson and Henley (1), op.cit., p.19.
11
Enforcement of land rights can be understood as the capacity to defend rights against other parties’
illegal eviction. The enforcement of property rights can be seen through how institutions (either formal
or informal ones) can effectively resolve land disputes and provide a “coherent property rights system.
“Kathryn Firmin A. Sellers, “The Politics of Property Rights,” American Political Science Review Vol. 89 No.
4 (December 1995): 867-881. See also: Douglass C. North (1), “Institutions and Credible Commitment,” p.
3, http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/3711/9412002.pdf?...1, accessed on 24 February 2014.
12
Dinnen, loc.cit.
13
Ibid., p. 2.
14
Lyda Favali and Roy Pateman, Blood, Land, and Sex: Legal and Political Pluralism in Eritrea (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 2.
15
Dinnen, op.cit., p. 19. See also the Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, “A Diverse National,” http://
www.embassyofindonesia.org/about/people.htm, accessed on 15 March 2014.
16
Davidson and Henley (1), op.cit., p. 3.
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After its independence in 1945, the Indonesian government had to deal with a
pluralist legal system comprising a combination of adat, colonial inheritance, and
Islamic legal influences. Despite decades of effort to unify legal systems in a formally
codified law, Indonesia today still witnesses the persistence of customary institutions
(adat), particularly in the outer islands (outside Java). Adat is a set of principles,
values, and local wisdoms that are embedded in a particular society and serves as an
integral part of indigenous social orders. Its main function is the preservation of order
and harmony within the society.

For the sake of simplicity, this article loosely defines adat law as customary law,
although Hooker argues that it has a broader meaning beyond that definition. The term
of adat can refer to one of the following: “law, rule, precept, morality, usage, custom,
agreement, conventions, principles, the act of conforming to the usage of society,
decent behaviour, ceremonial, the practice of magic, sorcery, rituals.” Therefore, he
contends that the precise meaning of adat depends upon a particular context.18

Despite facing challenges under state repression as well as modernity and
globalization, these adat institutions have not perished. Instead, they continue to be
one of the primary sources of law and provide an important informal mechanism of
conflict management at the local level. The persistence of adat, particularly in the
outer islands, shows that national law never fully supersedes adat. Instead, as Dinnen
notes, adat has proved remarkably resilient and continues to “adapt to the local and
external dynamics of social change.”19

Although at local level people are inclined to use adat institutions as the primary
legal source and show less reliance on the state-centred law, adat still receives limited
recognition at national level. Adat and legal pluralism to some extent are seen as a
potential threat to the national unity and stability. The Indonesian Constitution
and its later amendments recognize adat laws provided that they still exist in the
society and do not contravene the state law. Government policies are bent toward the
unification of the legal system, abandoning legal pluralism in the society and leaving
adat institutions at the periphery. The role of national law was strengthened at the
cost of adat law.20

The demise of Suharto’s regime in 1998 was followed by an emerging exigency
of the people’s demanding the renaissance or the revival of adat. The proponents
of the “adat revivalism movement” see adat as the “source of justice” to restore the
damage caused by the New Order regime and as the symbol of “national identity” and
“solidarity.”21 They seek the advancement of autonomy and resource distribution as

17
For further reading about the history of Indonesian legal system, see: Sebastiaan Pompe (1), The
Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publication, 2005). See also Bowen, loc.cit.
18
M. B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 50.
19
Dinnen, op.cit., p. 2
20
Sebastiaan Pompe (2), “Between Crime and Custom: Extra-marital Sex in Modern Indonesian Law,”
in Indonesia, Law and Society, 2nd ed., edited by Tim Lindsey (New South Wales: The Federation Press,
2008), p. 106.
21
The most notable damage done by Suharto’s New Order (1966-1998) was the uniformity of local bureaucratic structure through the Law Number 5 Year 1974, causing the abolishment of local diversity and
adat institutions at the local levels. The law replaced adat leaders and other adat institutions with “elected
but state-screened village headmen” operating within standardized bureaucratic fashion that resembles
the Javanese’s village structure “desa” (rural village). See Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley (2), eds., The
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well as the recognition of their institutions.22

As Davidson and Henley note, “the rise of indigenous movement is often thought
of as the continuation at sub-national level of an old tradition of anti-imperialism.”23
In Indonesian context, the revivalism of adat has become “the paradox of the postNew Order era.”24 On the one hand, adat is seen as a potent tool for “redressing
past injustices.” It is believed to be the cure for Indonesia’s chronic corruption and
ineffective institutions as well as the means to “promote more democratic forms of
village government.”25 It is also often linked to the notions of “territorial sovereignty,”
“the rights to access to justice and economic resources,” and other “indigenous
rights.”26

On the other hand, while adat is often viewed with certain levels of appreciation
and sympathy, it nevertheless presents a number of key weaknesses. The major
concerns are “political hierarchy” and “legitimation of social inequality” within the
community as well as the exclusion of other ethnic groups and settlers.27 Adat tends
toward inequality because a large portion of power is centred in the hands of adat
chiefs as well as local or customary elites. As Tania Li points out, adat “tend[s] to
privilege elites, especially senior men, who are empowered to speak on behalf of a
presumed whole,” leaving women disempowered.28
In addition, adat institutions lack checks and balances because there is no division
of powers between judiciary and other governmental organs within adat. Due to its
unwritten nature, principles and dispute resolution procedures in adat have often
been “loosely defined.”29 With the lack of internal accountability structures, adat
institutions are apt to have a greater possibility for creating abuse of power. Also,
while the revival of adat has strengthened ethnic identity and communal bonds, at the
same time it has generated the exclusion of outsiders.

In the next section, this paper presents a narrative description of adat institution
in Flores, its relationship with national law, and how adat is implemented as a
substitution for state law in resolving conflicts in Flores. It also seeks to answer these
questions: (1) who can be appointed as adat leaders? and (2) what are the sources of
their authority? This paper also discusses how adat responds to modern challenges
and how it is used in current situations.

III. Case Study: Land Dispute Resolution in Flores
A. A Glimpse of Flores, East Nusa Tenggara

In order to explain the role of adat in resolving land disputes, this paper employs

Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 10, 23 and 32.
22
Adriaan Bedner and Stijn van Huis, “The Return of the Native in Indonesian Law: Indigenous Communities in Indonesian Legislation,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde Vol. 164 No. 2/3 (2008):
167.
23
Davidson and Henley (1), op.cit., p. 5.
24
Ibid. p. 18.
25
Ibid. p. 4.
26
Ibid. p. 6.
27
Ibid. p. 4.
28
Tania M. Li, “Adat in Central Sulawesi: Contemporary Deployments” in The Revival of Tradition in
Indonesian Politics, edited by Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley, (London: Routledge, 2007).
29
Davidson and Henley (1), op.cit., p. 21.
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a case study of dispute resolution in Flores, East Nusa Tenggara Province. Flores is a
small island situated in eastern Indonesia, with an area of 14,300 square kilometers
that are divided into eight regencies.30
Picture 1: Map of the Flores Island31

The Flores population is predominantly Catholic,32 in stark contrast to other
Muslim-majority regions in Indonesia. The Catholic domination is attributed to
Flores’ distinct history. Unlike the other parts of Indonesia, Flores was colonized by
the Portuguese for centuries before it was sold to the Dutch in 1859. The name of
Flores itself originated from the Portuguese word for flowers. Portuguese traders
and missionaries spread Christianity in eastern Indonesia, including Flores. In the
subsequent colonization, the Catholic Church brought modernization to Flores
through schools, health centres, and social outreach.33

Adat plays a significant role in the maintenance of order and day-to-day life of
the people of Flores.34 It provides an important framework for the socio-political
order and constructs behavioural patterns in Flores. One of the distinct features of
adat is its universal and magic-religious nature. In adat system, “man, community
and the supernatural are seen as indistinguishable parts of a unitary whole.”35 The
main function of adat is, thus, to maintain and preserve harmony among people,
30
They are (1) West Manggarai, (2) Central Manggarai, (3) East Manggarai, (4) Ngada, (5) Nagekeo, (6)
Ende, (7) Sikka, and (8) East Flores.
31
Antropologi Indonesia, 56 (XXII): 70.
32
It was recorded that 128,915 out of 138,050 of the population are Catholics. Department of Religious
Affairs of Ngada 2008, in the Statistics of Ngada Regency. BPS Statistics of Ngada Regency, Ngada dalam
Angka 2009 [Ngada in Figures 2009], (Ngada: BPS Statistics of Ngada Regency, 2009), p. 146.
33
John Mansford Prior, “Land Disputes and the Church: Sobering Thoughts from Flores,” in Land for
the People: The State and Agrarian Conflict in Indonesia (Ohio University Research in International Studies,
Southeast Asia Series No. 126), edited by Anton Lucas and Carol Warren, (Athens: Ohio University Press,
2013), p. 216.
34
Maria D. Muga, “The Role of the Chief of Adat in Land Conflict Resolution through Mediation: Case
Study Ulayat Land Case at the District of SOA, Ngada, Flores, East Nusa Tenggara,” [“Peranan Kepala Adat
dalam Penyelesaian Sengketa Tanah Ulayat Melalui Mediasi: Studi Analisa Terhadap Penyelesaian Sengketa
Tanah, Tanah Ulayat di Kecamatan SOA Kabupaten Ngada, Flores, Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur”], (Thesis
at the Magister Program of Notary, University of Diponegoro, Semarang, 2008).
35
Sebastiaan Pompe (2), op.cit., p. 121.
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community, and nature.36Adat is usually unwritten; it is transmitted orally through
generation after generation and is reaffirmed by the decision of the chief of adat.

The people of Flores view adat as the primary source of law in managing natural
resource distribution among members of the society, enforcing their rights, and
resolving conflicts over land. According to adat law, all land in Flores including forests
is considered as communal land and belongs to a particular tribal group (woe) in a
given territory. The rights over communal land are often referred to as hak ulayat—
ulayat literally means territory or area, and hak means rights. Hak ulayat thus means
rights to a territory or area subject to adat law.

The enforcement of these rights relies heavily, if not exclusively, on the chief of
adat (Mosalaki). The unwritten laws of adat place the chief of adat in an extremely
privileged position and give him the authority to attach his own meaning or to interpret
the enforcement of adat laws. The power of adat institutions is centred on the chief of
adat as he is seen as an essential intermediary or link between the mundane and the
supernatural worlds. The chief of adat is perceived as the adat authority, serving to
maintain peace and order in the society.

The legitimacy of the chiefs of adat originates from their ancestors, is transmitted
by patrilineal lineage, and is maintained through social hierarchies embedded in adat
structure.37 The origin of their forefathers is a key criterion to explain their legitimacy.
In Flores, power relations and social hierarchies within the society are initiated,
developed, and maintained according to the system of precedence of their ancestors.

Historically, the people of Flores believe that their ancestors migrated from
outside the island through the northern coast of Flores. These first generation settlers
and their descendants are called ata nggoro. They are believed to be the first who
opened land and built settlements, paving the way for the establishment of social
order in Flores. Newcomers and their descendants who came after the villages had
been established are called ata mai.38

The history of the origin of Flores people determines their place in the
stratification of social life and social relations. As the first settlers, ata nggoros are
perceived to deserve more privileges than ata mai for their meritorious contributions
to community building at the earlest stages of their history. This “first-come, firstserved principle” continues to shape social structures within the society in which ata
nggoros enjoy advantages over ata mais, including exclusive authority over natural
resources and adat institutions. Only ata nggoro descendants can hold the position
of adat chief (Mosalaki), while the descendants of ata mai occupy the second layer in
their society as anakalo fa’é walu (commoners).39

The chief of adat maintains extensive power over a specific area where he carries
out his duties that derive from his position. His authority ranges from political to
economic matters and adat rituals. As the customary holder of authority over the
land, the chief of adat controls the use of land within his realm. The chief of adat is
authorized to distribute land to ana darinia (patrilineal descendants of Mosalaki’s

Ibid., p. 122.
J. Emmed M. Prioharyono, “The Mosalaki’s Political Power and Adat in Nggela and Tenda Villages, Ende Regency, Flores” [“Kekuasaan Politik dan Adat Para Mosalaki
di Desa Nggela dan Tenda, Kabupaten Ende, Flores], Antropologi Indonesia (Indonesian Journal on Social
and Cultural Anthropology) Vol. 33 No. 3 (September – December 2012).
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.,: 192.
36
37
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clan) and grant the rights to use cultivated land (watas) to the commoners (anakalo
fa’é walu).40

Adat tenure does not recognize individual ownership because ulayat land is
perceived as a communal property and thus cannot be sold individually or be registered
on an individual basis. Control over land is created, maintained, and protected by
adat system according to the local wisdom and knowledge. Land exchange through
sale and purchase or rent is usually limited among the community members. Outside
parties can obtain access to the land with the approval of the chief of adat, after they
provide a customary payment (usually money and cattle such as buffaloes, cows, and
so on) through adat ceremonies. Furthermore, alienation or pawning of communal
land can be done only with the chief’s consent, on behalf of the tribal/kinship group.
However, the land is still considered to belong to adat and should be returned to the
community after the tenure is completed.41

Problems arise when the practice of transferring rights to external parties becomes
very extensive and when the adat mechanism is insufficient to accommodate them.42
In line with the changes over time, including cultural changes, land has become a
commodity, leading to conflicts of interests over land possession and provoking land
disputes. Prior notes that, “as monetary needs increase by the year, the unity of the
village is strained by the competing needs of individual families who feel that they need
to sell land, this intensifies struggle within and between villages over land claims.”�
The involvement of outsiders in land acquisition for business interests aggravates the
conflicts over land ownership in Flores.
Table 1: Conflict Incidences in Flores, 2001 – 200343

District
Ende
East Flores
Manggarai
Ngada
Sikka
Total

General
Conflicts
83
104
108
76
82
453

Land and Natural Resources Conflicts
Resulted in
Resulted in
Total
Violence
Death
16
7
3
25
9
5
44
24
15
24
10
1
14
6
2
123
56
26

Ibid.,: 182.
Afrizal, “Oil Palm Plantations, Customary Rights, and Local Protest: A West Sumatran Case Study,” in
Land for the People: The State and Agrarian Conflict in Indonesia, edited by Anton Lucas and Carol Warren,
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013), pp. 151-152.
42
World Bank, World Development Report 2006: Equality and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 166.
43
Samuel Clark,ed., More Than Just Ownership: Ten Land and Natural Resource Conflict Case Studies
from East Java and Flores, (Conflict and Community Development Research and Analytical Program, Indonesian Social Development Paper No. 4), (The World Bank, 2004), p. 7.
40
41
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B. The Role of Adat Chief in Dispute Resolution

The chief of adat (Mosalaki) plays a central role in the process of dispute resolution
as the justice of the peace. He acts as the mediator in resolving any kind of disputes
between inhabitants of the same village, including disputes over land. He is seen
as the pillar who upholds adat law, and thus he becomes the primary actor in the
society for settling problems. Since there are no strict rules for resolving conflicts,
the chief of adat decides which approach and adat rule to apply in each case. The
primary means of dispute resolution is mediation in which the chief of adat will seek
reconciliation to achieve the best interests of the disputing parties. This process is
crucial in maintaining peacefulness and establishing order within this society.
Generally, the dispute resolution process based on adat law can proceed as
follows. A land dispute typically starts with a complaint or report to the chief of adat
by the party involved in the dispute or the victims. The chief of adat then follows
up the complaint by sending a notice for disputing parties to be present in an adat
hearing at an appointed time and place. The adjudication process begins with adat
rituals and prayer, led by the chief of adat. As a mediator, the chief of adat asks the
disputing parties to explain their standing in the dispute and show the supporting
proof for their claim. The process involves testimony of witnesses relevant to the case
to strengthen the claim of each party.44

After both parties have the opportunity to explain their case, the chief of adat as the
mediator delivers his view based on the facts presented in the adjudication process.
He then offers his resolution to the dispute. These adat hearings can take place several
times until the parties settle the dispute. If they finally reach an agreement, the chief
of adat produces a written testament signed by the parties, indicating that the dispute
is over.45

The main purpose of adat dispute settlement is reconciliation based on a win-win
solution for the disputing parties. The moral authority of the chief of adat contributes
to dispute mediation by calming anger and hostility among the disputing parties. The
key outcome of adat resolution is that once a matter has been settled the parties will
not bring it up again. An individual who violates adat’s decision will suffer punitive
action in the form of adat fines and other social sanctions.46

However, if adat mechanism fails to end the conflict, the chief of adat facilitates
further negotiation between both parties until they reach agreement or find another
way to settle their dispute. Not infrequently, the chief of adat suggests that the
disputing parties appeal to higher administrative officials such as the head of the subdistrict or regent. They may also bring the case before the state court, as a last resort.
In this regard, the case of Ngada residents can be seen as a perfect example of adat
institutions’ failure to accommodate the interests of parties from different villages,
because the parties eventually decide to settle their conflict through the involvement
of state apparatus.

Muga, loc.cit.
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46
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Ngada is one of the eight regencies in Flores, described as having a tropical dry
climate and consisting mostly of savanna and meadow. Ngada’s climate determines the
population’s livelihoods, primarily farming, forestry, hunting, and fishery.47 In 2008,
farming contributed 45.71% of gross product domestic regional of Ngada regency.48
Under current arrangements the Ngada regency covers an area of 1,620.92 km and
is divided into nine districts, 78 villages, and 16 urban villages, with a population of
138,050.49

In this case, the disputing parties are people from the villages of Seso (Meli tribe)
and Waepana, both located within the district of Soa. The object of the dispute is an
area of 10 hectares of ulayat land located in Turewuda, Waepana village. The Meli
tribe of Seso village claim that the land belonged to their ancestors as the site of their
customary ritual practices and as fields for shepherding and hunting. The source
of the dispute is related to what Davidson and Henley call “the continuity between
contemporary claims and the past practices.”50 Its origin dates back to the Dutch
colonization era when the Seso village was under the Bajawa kingdom. The king of
Bajawa (at the time, the chief of the Meli tribe) made an arrangement with the Dutch
government to divide land in the district of Soa into two parts.51

The eastern part of the land was given to the Dutch and was often called “Vanback”
land, while the western part was still under the control of the people of Seso village.
After the Independence, the Indonesian government appropriated the Vanback land
and declared it as state land. The conversion of Vanback land to state land was followed
by a redistribution program in which the government allotted the land to the people
without considering tribal origins and other historical factors. This program attracted
settlers outside the Meli tribe to inhabit and take control of the land for years. The
area where the former Vanback land was located came to be called Turewuda area in
Waepana village and was the object of the dispute.52
An increasing population and monetized local economy, combined with traditional
claims over land, are among the driving factors of land conflicts in Ngada. In particular,
people from Seso village depict people from Waepana as robbers of their customary
land. On the other hand, people from Waepana who have been living there for decades
perceive themselves to be the parties most entitled to the disputed land. They even
own official land certificates issued by the government.53

At first, the disputing parties employed adat institutions through a mechanism that
was mediated by the chief of adat. As bilateral negotiations between the two villages
failed, the parties sought the intervention of a third party as mediator to facilitate
communication between the disputants. They believed it was better to employ state
officials who were considered to be the neutral party to resolve the dispute. The
people from Seso village then made a complaint report to the National Land Agency
(Badan Pertanahan Nasional/BPN) of the Ngada regency.
Unfortunately, the author could not get access to more detailed information about
National Labor Force Survey, 2008, BPS - Statistics Indonesia, in Ngada in Figures 2009. p. 85
Ibid., p. 353
49
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the mediation process and how the dispute was resolved at this level. However,
according to secondary sources, the dispute was solved through a mediation in which
the head of local BPN acted as mediator. As a result, the people of Waepana agreed to
return the disputed land and pay compensation to the people of Seso.54

IV. Where to Place Adat in the Discourse on Informal Institutions?

The previous section examines adat institution on the assumption that it is a
coherent and static body of rules applicable in a given community rather than a diverse
and dynamic one. In fact, there is no single or uniform type of adat in Indonesia, and
this fact is a clear reflection of ethnic diversity that characterizes the country. Thus, it
is misleading to consider adat law as a single and fixed system as opposed to the state
legal system.

Contrary to common perception, adat is not a static institution. Adat is a dynamic
one because it constantly adapts to changes and evolves over time. Flexibility is
inherent in adat as it develops in parallel with the development of the society in
which it operates.55 In Flores, for example, although traditionally only ata nggoro
descendants can hold the chief of adat position, this rule is not strictly applied in
all Flores regions. In more heterogeneous areas with many settlers, a commoner
can be appointed as the holder of adat authority as long as he meets certain social
expectations. For instance, the Lio tribe in Nggela and Tenda villages choose their
chief of adat based on his merits and knowledge of Lio’s adat and traditions instead
of a patrilineal lineage.56

This illustration of land dispute resolution in Indonesia, where legal pluralism
prevails, offers an interesting account of the tension between adat and national law.
Multiple legal orders provide particular sets of rules, attitudes, and beliefs. At the micro
level, each ethnic or sub-ethnic group has its own rules and solutions to conflicts over
land, as do state institutions. As a result, individuals may choose one legal framework
over another to pursue their solutions.57 In this regard, social, economic, and political
powers play an important role in determining preference for a particular mechanism
for resolving land disputes.58 As Favali and Pateman contend, “conflicts over land are
also conflicts over power, hegemony, and legitimacy.”59
However, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between formal and informal
institution based on a “zero-sum relationship”60 in which the existence of one
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institution would imply the absence of the other. Many scholars tend to employ
“dichotomous formulation” such as state and non-state actors, formal and informal
institutions, and traditional and modern justice as if these institutions operate within
“discrete and separate spheres of justice.”61 In practice, they do not operate separately
or in isolation from each other.62 Rather, there is co-existence, institutional overlaps,
and interactions among these various legal orders.
Some informal dispute mechanisms involve actors from both the state apparatus
such as the police or local government officials and informal sector such as chiefs of
adat, religious leaders, or community elders. The same actor can function as a double
agent, representing adat and formal institutions. This would be the case, for example,
where the chief of adat is concurrently the head of the local government or a police
officer.63 In addition, the procedures applied in an informal dispute resolution could
refer to adat law or the combination of formal and informal rules.64

V. Broader Implication for Theoretical Debates on Property Rights
Institutions

People devise institutions to reduce uncertainty, overcome “social dilemmas,”65
and thus minimize transaction costs.66 In short, institutions structure people’s
“deliberations and decisions,” “organize all forms of repetitive and structured
interactions” and thus shape people’s behaviours.67

Parlevliet provides a helpful clarification of the concept of institution by laying
out three definitions.68 The first defines institutions as “rules of games.” North
introduces this narrow understanding of institutions by defining them as “humanly
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction.”69 These
constraints can be in the form of either formal or informal rules. The second defines
institutions as “rules and behavioural practices.” This definition is important to
explain why illicit behaviour such as corruption and clientelism fall into the category
of informal institutions. The last definition posits that institutions are “rules and
organization.” It points to an overlapping, sometimes confusing, account of the
difference between institutions and organizations. In common usage, institutions and
organizations are often used interchangeably; thus it remains debatable whether or
not it is useful to make a distinction between the two.70
While most scholars have reached a broad consensus that institutions are related
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to economic growth and development, they diverge in the way they categorize
institutions and the way institutions can contribute to the society. Previous studies
predominantly treat formal institutions as determinant factors in realizing desirable
developmental outcomes.71 Later scholars, however, cast doubt on the notion of
formal institutions as the only source of economic growth. They contend that informal
institutions should also be taken into account.72
Debate about property rights institutions also revolves around an even further
distinction between institutions: whether formal or informal institutions and
whether private or communal systems are effective in revealing productive potential
of property rights. A dominant view in this debate is that formalized private property
rights are pivotal in providing land tenure security and thus encouraging development
and economic growth.73 Seller, on the other hand, contends that it is customary land
tenure that generates productive investment and thus promotes sustained economic
growth in Akyem Abuakwa, a traditional entity in Ghana. She then suggests that
enforcement is the key element in securing property rights regardless of whether or
not the system is operating under private property rights or customary land tenure.74

Brule’ provides an examination on the relationship between formal and informal
institutions related to land rights in rural North India. Central to her analysis is
the question about the role of formal and informal property rights institutions in
resolving land dispute. She contends that Indian caste system plays a significant role
in determining formal adjudication outcomes. Some influential castes enjoy greater
access to economic resources and legal security than the less influential ones. As a
result, India’s formal court does not provide equal treatment to all castes, favouring
some castes at the expense of the others.75 Her finding suggests that informal
institutions are complementary to the formal ones. Informal institutions such as caste
system operate as a means of coordinating interests within the same caste, while the
formal ones provide law enforcement through its coercive power. A combined use
of both formal and informal institutions will result in a more efficient land dispute
resolution.76

This paper contributes to the debate on how formal and informal institutions are
used to secure property rights and to resolve dispute over land. Adat plays major role
in resolving land disputes in Flores, East Nusa Tenggara. It provides certain levels
of security and has proven to be effective in resolving conflicts in a relatively closed
and homogenous community setting. It offers a greater accessibility, flexibility, and
legitimacy that support reconciliation process between the disputing parties. If
the disputes remain unresolved, a neutral mediator or umpire is called in with the
authority to impose a decision.
However, despite its advantages in dispute resolution, adat possesses certain
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limitations, particularly when the dispute involves exogenous parties such as other
ethnic groups or settlers. Given its narrow scope of jurisdiction, “adat cannot
normally function as a sovereign authority for adjudicating disputes among parties of
different origin.”77 It has also proven to be powerless against the state (central or local
government) and private corporations.

Furthermore, this paper finds that there is interplay between adat and state
institutions, in which the action of one institution inevitably affects the other. The
interaction between adat and state law brings about the issue on the relationship
between formal and informal institutions. According to Helmke and Levitsky, informal
institutions interact with formal ones in four ways: complementary, accommodating,
competing and substitutive.78

The relationship between adat and state institutions varies, depending on the
context. Adat rules may or may not conflict with the state rules, but unless we look
at a particular dispute, we cannot see in practice how they interrelate.79 In some
circumstances, adat may serve as an alternative institution to the state legal system.
For example, a state official may choose direct cases to adat mechanism. Likewise, the
chief of adat may refer certain cases such as serious crimes (murder, terrorism, and so
forth) to the police. In other cases, adat institutions may operate in a complementary
manner with the formal ones, in which adat provides social mechanisms in ensuring
the obedience to a particular state law. Furthermore, adat may also compete with the
state law when it imposes discriminatory provisions toward women, maintains social
inequality, and violates the principles of due process of law.
Using as an example the case of land disputes in Ngada regency, this paper
discusses the causes and the traditional rules that have been devised to settle them.
What is particularly interesting in the case of Ngada is that state apparatus applied
adat law in mediating the dispute, rather than tried to impose the state law. According
to the state law, a land certificate is the highest proof of land ownership. Had the state
law been used to resolve the dispute, it should have ruled/arbitrated in favour of the
people from Waepana who owned land certificates. However, it turned out that the
mediation was won by the people of Seso who claimed their rights on the basis of
adat law.

It confirms Reerink’s study that “semi-formal tenure” based on adat rights may
provide strong security, in a sense that it offers “actual protection” to the landholders
“against involuntary removal, irrespective of the legal status of land tenure.”80 This
thesis has broad implications for theoretical debates concerning matters such as (1)
the way property rights over land should be enforced; (2) the relationship between
formalized land title and tenure security; and (3) the conditions in which semi-formal
tenures provide strong a sense of security. Further investigation on these issues is
necessary to examine the relationship between land tittles and tenure security.
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VI. Conclusion
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By employing the case of land dispute resolution in Flores, this paper offers an
account on how people in Flores resolve their disputes in cooperative and amicable
fashion, without the involvement of state institutions. This finding seems to support
Ellickson’s suggestion that better-enforced and less costly local systems of rules and
sanctions often exist without the involvement of state.81 Ellickson utilizes a case of
cattle-trespass damage in Shasta County to illustrate how ranchers and farmers settle
their disputes. Unlike Coase’s suggestion,82 residents in Shasta County do not employ
legal entitlement as a starting point for bargaining due to their limited knowledge
about law. Instead, they use “commonsense” to reach “mutual advantage.”

This paper, however, challenges Ellickson’s argument for his narrow understanding
of law as statutory, written rule that is passed by legislative bodies. Adat communities
apply customary law which consists of sets of rules, beliefs, and principles embodied
in their society. Hierarchical coordination flow is present in adat law, albeit not
formally institutionalized. Therefore, rather than confirming that social order can be
achieved without law, this paper suggests that it can be attained without the state
intervention.
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